An Introduction to Reading 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations:
The first 3 Aphorisms 
with Commentary by Lois Shawver
If you are intending to make a serious reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations without a teacher, and want a guide to help you get started, you might prefer a free side by side commentary on the first 88 passages of this book.  You can reach this commentary by clicking here. If you want a more introductory and entertaining overview of Wittgenstein's philosophy, you might consider purchasing the DVD, When Wittgenstein and Lyotard Talked with Jack and Jill available at Amazon or by calling 1-800-431-1579.  It is also available through most bookstores with an ISBN number of 978-0-9773838-1-8.

Wittgenstein is a key thinker in postmodern therapy theory today.  He was the profound influence behind the writings of:  Harry Goolishian and Harlene Anderson, Kenneth Gergen, John Shotter, Fred Newman, Lois Holtzman, Steve de Shazer, and many others, including my own writing. 

This page is meant to give you a first acquaintance with the work that all the above theorists believe is his most important work for therapists: 

Wittgenstein, L. (1963). Philosophical Investigations.
New York: The Macmillan Company. 

The original text of this work was in German, and what we are reading is an English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe, a student of Wittgenstein's.  Traditionally, the text has been published in English with the German version facing the English version on each page.  Today there are paperback versions of the text in English without the simultaneous presentation in German.  There has been, of course, much more recent publication dates than the one I referencing above, but I am using this text to create the present page. 

The Philosophical Investigations is typically referred to by students of Wittgenstein simply as "the Investigations."  You should know that this was Wittgenstein's second major work.  His first major work was called "The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" which is itself typically referred to simply as "the Tractatus."   For the most part, you can think of "early Wittgenstein" as being reflected in the Tractatus while "later Wittgenstein" is reflected in the Investigations.  There are, however, many recent Wittgenstein texts made available through compilations of Wittgenstein's notes being published posthumously.  These can generally be thought of as "later Wittgenstein." 

The Investigations was based on a criticism of certain aspects of the Tractatus.  Although some people claim that the two works are not very different, I feel that claim fails to recognize the enormity of the difference.  Although there is a significant thread of connection between the reasoning in Tractatus and that in the Investigations, in my opinion at least, the two texts have enormously different implications for the therapy.  Early Wittgenstein would take us into a tedious examination of the truth-value of word maps created in language.  Later Wittgenstein takes us into a much more pragmatic and action-oriented view of language than does early Wittgenstein - but he does not forget this map because it is living, breathing, part of all of our lives.  Still, later Wittgenstein has a new concern and appreciation for the inherent rhetoric of language that we do not get in the Tractatus.  Later Wittgenstein gives us tools for understanding the way our conversations construct our psychological reality, capture our imagination, confuse us and dispel our confusions. 

The Investigations, itself, consists of two books, with the first book being much longer than the second.  The text in each book consists of numbered aphorisms, that is,  short numbered passages.  These aphorisms are often cross-referenced and they will be referred to as numbers within parenthesis.  On this page, this references are linked. 

The text below is the first three aphorisms in the Investigations  plus my commentary.


 
Aphorism #1
Commentary
1. "When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out.  Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples; the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of the voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something.  Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires." This is a quotation that Wittgensteinn has taken from Augustine (Confessions, I.8.).  Visualize Augustine's picture of how languge is learned and notice how natural and complete it sounds as a total explanation for how language is learned.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language.  It is this: the individual words in language name objects--sentences are combinations of such names.--In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning.  The meaning is correlated with the word.  It is the object for which the word stands. Now, Wittgensetein is beginning his commentary.  The emphasis is mine.  It is the deconstruction of Augustine's picture of language that is the focus of this entire book.  (Although, I should say, that many others other than Augustine have shared this picture of language.)  Once deconstucted, new and strikingly different ideas about languge begin to emerge.
Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word.  If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like 'table', 'chair', 'bread', and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself. Here the deconstruction begins. 
Looking at the Augustine picture of language we see that Augustine has explained only one type of word.
 
 

 

Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping.  I give him a slip marked 'five red apples'.  He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked 'apples', then he looks up the word 'red' in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers--I assume that he knows them by heart--up to the word 'five' and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.--It is in this and simlar ways that one operates with words--"But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?" ---Well, I assume that he 'acts' as I have described.  Explanations come to an end somewhere.--But what is the meaning of the word 'five'? --No such thing was in question here, only how the word 'five' is used. This scenario is a thought experiment.  To what extent do you think the language in this scenario is explained by Augustine's picture of language?  Think of the shopkeeper counting out the apples, one through five.  Did he learn to do this by someone pointing to five apples?  Hardly.  The teaching of language by pointing cannot explain learning to count.  What about using written languge to communicate what is wanted?  Someone had to teach him to read the note and translate that into a order -- which includes, incidentally, much more than is contained in the note - which just says 'five red apples.'  The shopkeeper has to be able to find the apples and to know to put them in a sack, accept money in exchange for them.  It would be hard to explain all of this within the Augustinian picture of language. 

.


 
Aphorism #2
Commentary
2.  That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions.  But one can also say 
that it is the idea of a language more 
primitive than ours. 
 
 












 

By "that philosophical concept of meaning" Wittgenstein means the Augustinian picture that he gave us above.  Look at Augustine's picture  again: 
 
The individual words in language name objects--sentences are combinations of such names.  Every word has a meaning.  The meaning is correlated with the word.  It is the object for which the word stands.

This concept of meaning, Wittgensein says, has its place in helping us understand primitive language, language more primitive than English, German, French, etc.  It is also the case, Wittgenstein explains, that there are regions of our developed language in which language works just as Augustine portrays it.

Let us imagine a language ...The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B.  A is building with building-stones; there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams.  B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them.  For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beam'.  A calls them out; --B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. -- Conceive this as a complete primitive language.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

This is an important thought experiment.  Although he does not call it a language-game in this passage, it will become clear shortly that this passage describes the prototypic primitive language-game.  He will refer to it often, sometimes in its present form, or in one of a multitude of variations he will give us shortly. 

We will often refer to this as language game (2), using the number of the aphorism to index the number of the language game.    I picture a work supervisor at the front of a site with a worker responding to the supervisor's commands.  There are piles of pillars, slabs and beams.  The supervisor calls out "Slab!" and the worker brings a slab and sets it at the supervisor's feet.  Pretty simple. 

Wittgnstein puts forth language-game (2) in order to try to envision a language in which Augustine's picture of language works. 

Does Augustine's picture of language work here?  How did the worker learn this language by teachers pointing and naming the slabs and beams as Augustine suggested?  An exercise like Augustine suggests might explain how the worker knew which object to fetch, but how did learn to fetch?  As opposed, say, to taking them behind the fence?  Crushing them? Or tapping them with a stone?

Aphorism #3
Commentary
3.  Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system.  And one has to say this in many cases where the question arises 'Is this an appropriate description or not?'  The answer is:  'Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe." 

It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules..." --and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others.  You can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those games. 

 
Somehow Augustine's picture of language, although appropriate for a subsection of langauge, is not as all inclusive an explanation of language as we are, at first glance, inclined to believe. 

As Wittgenstein says in (1), we tend to sweep under the rug all the uses of language that do not fit the Augustinian picture that seems to capture our imagination. 

Although language-game (2) restricts the vocabulary to words that seem to refer to objects, the Augustinian picture cannot explain everything that happens. 
 

 

This is just the beginning of Wittgenstein's deconstruction of Augustine's picture of language.  In the course of this text, he will give us a glimpse of the way language confuses us.  He will say: 
 
122.   A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not 'command a clear view' of the use of our words. 

And it is this Augustinian picture of language that has us mesmerized.  He will try to show us how this picture works to distract us from the working of language that is before our eyes. 

He will also give us some hint as to how to manage and reduce our confusion.  He says 
 

133. There are different philosophical methods like different therapies.
But it is an ongoing battle. 
 
109 Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of a language. 
The potential confusions are built into our language and are exaggerated by the Augustinian picture that he is trying to deconstruct. 
More information on Wittgenstein will be made available over time.  In the meantime, you might glance at a page that explains Wittgenstein's concept of a language-game.

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