Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: The first 3 Aphorisms with Commentary by Lois Shawver
Wittgenstein is a key thinker in postmodern therapy theory today. He was the profound influence behind the writings of: Harry Goolishian and Harlene Anderson, Kenneth Gergen, John Shotter, Fred Newman, Lois Holtzman, Steve de Shazer, and many others, including my own writing. This page is meant to give you a first acquaintance with the work that all the above theorists believe is his most important work for therapists: Wittgenstein, L. (1963). Philosophical
Investigations. The original text of this work was in German, and what we are reading is an English translation by G. E. M. Anscombe, a student of Wittgenstein's. Traditionally, the text has been published in English with the German version facing the English version on each page. Today there are paperback versions of the text in English without the simultaneous presentation in German. There has been, of course, much more recent publication dates than the one I referencing above, but I am using this text to create the present page. The Philosophical Investigations is typically referred to by students of Wittgenstein simply as "the Investigations." You should know that this was Wittgenstein's second major work. His first major work was called "The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" which is itself typically referred to simply as "the Tractatus." For the most part, you can think of "early Wittgenstein" as being reflected in the Tractatus while "later Wittgenstein" is reflected in the Investigations. There are, however, many recent Wittgenstein texts made available through compilations of Wittgenstein's notes being published posthumously. These can generally be thought of as "later Wittgenstein." The Investigations was based on a criticism of certain aspects of the Tractatus. Although some people claim that the two works are not very different, I feel that claim fails to recognize the enormity of the difference. Although there is a significant thread of connection between the reasoning in Tractatus and that in the Investigations, in my opinion at least, the two texts have enormously different implications for the therapy. Early Wittgenstein would take us into a tedious examination of the truth-value of word maps created in language. Later Wittgenstein takes us into a much more pragmatic and action-oriented view of language than does early Wittgenstein - but he does not forget this map because it is living, breathing, part of all of our lives. Still, later Wittgenstein has a new concern and appreciation for the inherent rhetoric of language that we do not get in the Tractatus. Later Wittgenstein gives us tools for understanding the way our conversations construct our psychological reality, capture our imagination, confuse us and dispel our confusions. The Investigations, itself, consists of two books, with the first book being much longer than the second. The text in each book consists of numbered aphorisms, that is, short numbered passages. These aphorisms are often cross-referenced and they will be referred to as numbers within parenthesis. On this page, this references are linked. The text below is the first three aphorisms in the Investigations plus my commentary. |
| 1. "When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shown by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples; the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of the voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires." | This is a quotation that
Wittgensteinn has taken from Augustine (Confessions,
I.8.). Visualize Augustine's picture
of how languge is learned and notice how
natural and complete it sounds as a total
explanation for how language is learned.
|
| These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects--sentences are combinations of such names.--In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. The meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands. | Now, Wittgensetein is beginning his commentary. The emphasis is mine. It is the deconstruction of Augustine's picture of language that is the focus of this entire book. (Although, I should say, that many others other than Augustine have shared this picture of language.) Once deconstucted, new and strikingly different ideas about languge begin to emerge. |
| Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked 'five red apples'. He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer marked 'apples', then he looks up the word 'red' in a table and finds a colour sample opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers--I assume that he knows them by heart--up to the word 'five' and for each number he takes an apple of the same colour as the sample out of the drawer.--It is in this and simlar ways that one operates with words--"But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?" ---Well, I assume that he 'acts' as I have described. Explanations come to an end somewhere.--But what is the meaning of the word 'five'? --No such thing was in question here, only how the word 'five' is used. | This scenario is a
thought experiment. To what extent do
you think the language in this scenario is
explained by Augustine's picture of
language? Think of the shopkeeper
counting out the apples, one through
five. Did he learn to do this by
someone pointing to five apples?
Hardly. The teaching of language by
pointing cannot explain learning to
count. What about using written
languge to communicate what is wanted?
Someone had to teach him to read the note
and translate that into a order -- which
includes, incidentally, much more than is
contained in the note - which just says
'five red apples.' The shopkeeper has
to be able to find the apples and to know to
put them in a sack, accept money in exchange
for them. It would be hard to explain
all of this within the Augustinian picture
of language.
. |
| 2. That philosophical concept of
meaning has its place in a primitive idea of
the way language functions. But one
can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours.
|
By "that
philosophical concept of meaning"
Wittgenstein means the Augustinian picture
that he gave us above. Look at
Augustine's picture again:
This concept of meaning, Wittgensein says, has its place in helping us understand primitive language, language more primitive than English, German, French, etc. It is also the case, Wittgenstein explains, that there are regions of our developed language in which language works just as Augustine portrays it. |
| Let us imagine a language ...The language
is meant to serve for communication between
a builder A and an assistant B. A is
building with building-stones; there are
blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B
has to pass the stones, and that in the
order in which A needs them. For this
purpose they use a language consisting of
the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab',
'beam'. A calls them out; --B brings
the stone which he has learnt to bring at
such-and-such a call. -- Conceive this as a
complete primitive language.
|
This is an important
thought experiment. Although he does
not call it a language-game in this passage,
it will become clear shortly that this
passage describes the prototypic primitive
language-game. He will refer to it
often, sometimes in its present form, or in
one of a multitude of variations he will
give us shortly.
We will often refer to this as language game (2), using the number of the aphorism to index the number of the language game. I picture a work supervisor at the front of a site with a worker responding to the supervisor's commands. There are piles of pillars, slabs and beams. The supervisor calls out "Slab!" and the worker brings a slab and sets it at the supervisor's feet. Pretty simple. Wittgnstein puts forth language-game (2) in order to try to envision a language in which Augustine's picture of language works. Does Augustine's picture of language work here? How did the worker learn this language by teachers pointing and naming the slabs and beams as Augustine suggested? An exercise like Augustine suggests might explain how the worker knew which object to fetch, but how did learn to fetch? As opposed, say, to taking them behind the fence? Crushing them? Or tapping them with a stone? |
| 3. Augustine, we might say, does
describe a system of communication; only not
everything that we call language is this
system. And one has to say this in
many cases where the question arises 'Is
this an appropriate description or
not?' The answer is: 'Yes, it is
appropriate, but only for this narrowly
circumscribed region, not for the whole of
what you were claiming to
describe."
It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules..." --and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those games. |
Somehow Augustine's
picture of language, although appropriate
for a subsection of langauge, is not as all
inclusive an explanation of language as we
are, at first glance, inclined to
believe.
As Wittgenstein says in (1), we tend to sweep under the rug all the uses of language that do not fit the Augustinian picture that seems to capture our imagination. Although language-game (2)
restricts the vocabulary to words that seem
to refer to objects, the Augustinian picture
cannot explain everything that
happens.
|
This is just the beginning of
Wittgenstein's deconstruction of Augustine's
picture of language. In the course of
this text, he will give us a glimpse of the
way language confuses us. He will
say:
And it is this Augustinian picture of language that has us mesmerized. He will try to show us how this picture works to distract us from the working of language that is before our eyes. He will also give us some hint as to how
to manage and reduce our confusion. He
says
|
| More information on Wittgenstein will be made available over time. In the meantime, you might glance at a page that explains Wittgenstein's concept of a language-game. |
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