by Tom Strong 

Jonathan Potter is Professor of Discourse Analysis at Loughborough 
University and has previously co-authored "Mapping the language of racism" 
and "Discourse and social psychology" (with Margaret Wetherell), "Social 
texts and contexts" (with Peter Striger and Margaret Wetherell), and 
"Discursive psychology" (with Derek Edwards). His work has been at the 
forefront of recent contributions to the developing social constructionist 
critical literature. 

He describes the Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction as a book about the "business done with descriptions".  In this book, we are taken through Potter's answers to two self-posed questions: "how are descriptions produced so that they will be treated as factual?" and "how are these factual descriptions put together in ways that allow them to perform particular actions?"  He regards "facts" as descriptions of experience meeting established norms of scientific or other forms of agreement that exist within communities of speakers of such "facts". But, these "facts" are also used in communication to achieve results within those communities as shown in this quote: 
 

In answering how our descriptions come to be regarded as "factual" Potter takes the reader through chapters on the sociology of scientific knowledge,  ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, semiology-post-structuralism-postmodernism, discourse and construction, interests and category entitlements, before he concludes with chapters entitled: "Constructing Out-thereness" and "Working up Representations." Minimally, Potter is trying to convey a view of "fact" that is clearly at odds with a modernist understanding: 
 

For Potter, the resolution of a scientific controversy creates "dead facts", the apparent agreement arising from a controversy's resolution should in no way imply that something now exists as "nonrhetorical rhetoric". Potter deftly moves through different forms of fact construction, critiquing the analyses of those involved in the studies of these forms, while offering accessible (and at times, humorous) examples to flesh out his points. 

In typical postmodern fashion, he helps to deconstruct the commonly held modernist notion put forward by Bishop Butler that, "everything is what it is and not another thing." Instead, Potter gets us to look closer at what has been involved in the creation of facts, to help us see how they are inseparable from the rhetorical processes that make us social beings. Regardless of whether the "facts" cited are being used to resolve legal proceedings, scientific debates or domestic arguments he asks us to examine how the "facts" were created as descriptions and how they are used. He is particularly critical of the rhetorical practice of "working up representations to portray 'out-thereness'," a practice common to scientific discourse in which facts are portrayed as having no 
connection to the authors writing about them. This is despite the authors' 
choice of these phenomena of study, and the probability that they would be 
willing to accept Nobel prizes for writing about these facts. Facts are not neutral descriptions in Potter's view and should be understood as influential ways of producing forms of knowing that meet the rhetorical standards of the communities of speakers in which they will be shared. 

So, how might these extensions of Potter's thinking inform our developing 
practice as therapists? Facts are cited as the proof or bedrock truth claims and Potter thoroughly discredits their portrayal as capitol T TRUTH, in the manner one associates with objective or religious truth. We are incapable of separating ourselves either from the phenomena we attempt to describe, or from the language we use to not only portray that phenomena but to convince others of its facticity. How, for example, might counsellors listen for, and explore "dead facts" in relationships when these "facts" can act in ways that Norwegian psychiatrist, Tom Andersen (1995), once referred to as "stalled conversations"? 

Potter has set his aim on the most authoritative and loud voices in all forms of 
conversation, suggesting that, while they may have their own rigour for accepting something as convincing (i.e., rhetorically persuasive), this does not do anything more than meet the "club requirements" for an ongoing discussion within the "club". When FACT is brought forward, Potter's most important question is "why is this description being used". Truth claims are often unrecognized attempts to "rig conversation" and it seems important to understand the purpose for their use rather than engage in futile forms of argumentation. I remember a quote from Humberto Maturana  (1988) and his colleagues: "Any claim to objectivity is an absolute command for obedience". In postmodern therapy, where all meanings are regarded as fair ball for deconstruction, Potter trots out facts as that which is seemingly most difficult to refute and highlights how, like all forms of justification, they are linguistic constructions that serve rhetorical purposes and can therefore be deconstructed. 

Andersen, T. (1995) Reflecting processes; acts of informing and forming: 
You can borrow my eyes, but you must not take them away from me. In S. 
Friedman (Ed.) The reflecting team in action, New York: Guilford, (pp 11-37). 

Caplan, P. (1991). How do they decide who is normal? The bizarre, but true tale of the DSM-IV process.  Canadian Psychology 32:162-170. 

Mendez, C, Coddu, F. & Maturana, H. (1988) The bringing forth of 
pathology. Irish Journal of Psychology, 9, 144-172