Searle does not accept the Tractatus idea of "atomic propositions"
nor does he accept the idea that propositions "picture" facts. He points
out well-known objections: What would a negative proposition, e.g., "There
is no cat on the mat," picture and how would that picture differ from
that
pictured by "There is no dog on the mat"? And what would a hypothetical
proposition, "If there is a cat on the mat, then there is no dog on the
mat," picture? The picture theory of meaning does not hold up.
But he does hold, as Shotter reminds us, a representational
theory of meaning, namely that true statements represent (Searle
uses the widely used term, "correspond" to) facts. Searle,
following his mentor, J.
L. Austin, holds that sentences aim at lots of things: commands aim
at bringing some fact into existence ("Close the door."), statements aim
at describing some fact which is, was, or will be in existence ("The
door is closed"), etc. Some commands succeed in their aim and are
obeyed; some statements succeed in their aim and are true.
Searle's final chapter, "Truth and Correspondence,"
attempts to defend this view. It is, as Nick correctly sees, at the
heart of his Modernism.
Shotter, in his review, rejects the Correspondence view, but does not
argue against it nor does he spell out an alternative.
He leaves that for his other writings.
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