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The Rich Textuality that is Psycho-analysis
Derrida's(1998) recent work on psycho-analysis examines the compulsion to interpret meaning through the use of rationality, to establish an institutionalised discipline or knowledge by the use of "analysis as a methodical operation of unknotting and technique of untying"(p.15). Derrida shows how the enlightenment motif of reason manifests in psychoanalysis as the idea that psychological meaning is a simple, indivisible singularity, that can be 'analysed' in the sense of uncovered, untied, dissolved and interpreted, including the 'resistances' to this analysis. Like Bion, what Derrida (1998) questions is not analytic knowledge as such, but the desire for such knowledge based on," the desire for simple and self-present originarity"(p.29). Derrida's thesis is that meaning is the weaving of a rich textuality, there is not one but thousands of threads, which is not to deny the possibility of analysis, of objective meaning but to suggest it's complexity: "The question of divisibility is one of the most powerful instruments of formalisation for what is called deconstruction. If, in an absurd hypothesis, there were one and only one deconstruction, a sole thesis of "Deconstruction", it would pose divisibility: difference as divisibility" (p.33). If meaning is never totally present, there is always an excess of meaning, so that analysis is 'interminable', there is always a remainder to be analysed, in effect, "one must analyse endlessly"(p.35). Derrida does not reject the notion of 'analysis' as such, merely it's appropriation by an Enlightenment philosophy of analysis, which limits the possibilities of meaning in the text, whether philosophical or psychoanalytic, to rational enquiry by the analyst. For Derrida (1998) the analysis of a singular meaning(the analyst's)and interpretation of other meanings (the analysand's) as resistance is a political action which does violence to the voice of the other: "To analyse anything whatsoever, anyone whatsoever, for anyone whatsoever, would mean saying to the other: choose my solution, prefer my solution, take my solution, love my solution; you will be in the truth if you do not resist my solution"(p.9). The spirit of reason ceaselessly analyses and leaves no space for the absence of meaning, for not-knowing, for a being with, a waiting for meaning to happen in dialogic encounter with the other. This is not to deny the possibility of meaning, but to see it as a rich textuality, not as one meaning, the meaning, as objective truth, but many paradoxical meanings. Derrida demonstrates in the Freudian text itself an antithesis to this psychology of indivisible analysis showing in the case of Freud's dreams, sense and meaning is more like a rich tapestry, a 'tangled mass of threads' that defies or resists analysis. In effect, Derrida shows how Freud himself questions the limits of his own epistemology, that psychoanalytic reason is possible, that the analytic material can necessarily be given a meaning, that knots can be untied, that 'veiled truth', can "be interpreted, analysed, made explicit, explained"(p.10). In this regard Derrida (1998) notes: "Freud, then, has the premonition (Ich ahne) that something exceeds the analysis"(p.4). For Derrida (1998) deconstructed meaning is a complexity constituted by double bind and paradox, it resists the binary oppositions of discourse,like that between sense and non-sense. Meaning is a complexity which cannot be finally analysed, for example, the wishes underlying dreams cannot be simply revealed, in other words the analysis of psychological meaning is ongoing. Derrida's argument is not with psychoanalysis but with the modern philosophy of reason which it inherits, but even here he recognises to simply reject a hermeneutics of meaning would set up an opposition to analysis, another analysis of analysis, which merely repeats what is being deconstructed. As Derrida (1998) notes: "What is called deconstruction undeniably
obeys an analytic exigency, at once critical and analytic. It is
always a matter of
Deconstruction itself is a 'hyperanalyticism'which is doubly bound, both to the enlightenment form of psychoanalytic reason, the notion of the simple and indivisible meaning, and to that which in psychoanalysis resists it. Derrida notes: "But here, without delay, comes the double bind: to analyse such a desire does not mean to renounce it's law and to suspend the order of reason,of meaning,of the question of the origin, of the social bond" (p.36). And again it is this double bind which "is the question of analysis itself" (p.36), which makes psychoanalysis as a form of analysis,itself possible and not only that but responsibility, freedom and decision. What is under analysis is the notion of analysis itself, as a hegemony or discourse of reason, which imagines under the rich tapestry of the human conversation lies a final hidden meaning waiting to be discovered and revealed in all it's simplicity. Derrida's (1998) argument is that without 'the ordeal of aporia' (p.37), thought and analysis itself is not possible. The nature of this aporia compels us all,deconstructionists included, to desire a meaning which eludes rationality and yet is not this the great discovery of psychoanalysis itself? The challenge which Derrida sets is how to think, and here he draws on the analogy of the weaver,that meaning is not simple but more like an"endless and bottomless divisibility" (p.37). But paradoxically this is the thesis of psychoanalysis also,that meaning cannot be subject to rational analysis, yet from a deconstructive perspective it must be so:"Is not this double bind the question of analysis itself?," which cannot be analysed but, "one can only endure it in passion”(p.36). It is this passion which is the subject of psychoanalysis,the struggle for reason in the context of non-reason or irrationality, for thought in the light of emotion, for objectivity in the face of an overwhelming subjectivity, for meaning which is never present without at the same time being elusive.
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