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| 1. Here a brief comment on Derrida's understanding of self is warranted,
particularly as social construction theorists regularly cite deconstruction
to support the demise of a centred self. For example, Sampson
(1989b) comments: 'Derrida's conception, however, gives us a fully
non-centred and non-centrable representation of personhood'
(p.15). And again: 'The Derridian subject can never be set apart from the multiple others who are its very essence' (p.16). Here the binary 'self/other' is overturned and resolved in favour of the latter. However, Derrida (1981) notes the simple inversion of a hierarchy merely 'brings low what was high' (p.42) and remains within a modernist metaphysics. |
1. Social constructionists such as Sampson (1989) often mention Derrida's idea that the centered self has been "deconstructed". However, we know that Derrida thinks that the centered self is not deconstructed simply by the reversal of focus from self to other. Such a reversal leaves us trapped in modernist metaphysics. For the self to be deconstructed in Derrida's sense something else is required. |
| 2. Unlike postmodernism, Derrida's deconstructive movement is not 'from' psychology's subject 'to the textual other, but back and forth. We cannot move beyond the metaphysical self 'while' we are moving beyond it (Larner, 1994a). In Derrida's (1981) 'strange logic of differAnce the textual chain of meaning, such as self 'and' other, remains open, so there is 'an irreducible and generative multiplicity' (p.45). Ther is self 'and' there is other. |
2. By its concern with oppression and relationships, postmodernism has shifted the focus from the self to the other. This is not Derrida's philosophy. Derrida pictures the deconstruction of the centered self as continuous moving back and forth between self and other - not as a moving beyond. For Derrida, the deconstructed self-other phenomenon is created by the chain of meaning in our ongoing converasation which continuously generates and revises the boundary between between self and other. What is today self is tomorrow other and vice versa. "It is you that are at fault here," someone tells us, "or perhaps it is me", and with each statement, the lines between self and other are redrawn. |
| 3. For Derrida, the self is undoubtedly intertextual and relational; nontheless his recent writings on ethics and justice call for the recogtnition of an ethical and political subject (Larner, 1997). Derrida says: 'I believe that without a movement of narcissistic reappropriation, the rapport with the other would be destroyed absolutely, destroyed in advance (quoted in Smith, 1995, pp. 111-112). Elsewhere Derrida (1984) states: 'If the other was not recognized as ego, it's entire alterity would collapse' (p.125). To be in ethical relation to others requires some knowledge of persons, a 'you' as distinct from 'me'. We are not all equals in discourse but different from each other. A respect for the heterogeneity of others is a necessary aspect of the dialogic relationship (Derrida, 1988). The other whom I am in relation to is always an 'individual' other, even though constituted by language and relationships. | 3. In spite of this language based understanding
of the deconstructed self, recently, Derrida has called for recognition
of the ethical and political subject (Larner, 1997).
This is a call away from the deconstructed self. It is a post-deconstruced
self. In this new writing, Derrida tells us he believes that unless
we revise our experience of self and make it centered we will have no rapport
with the other.
He states that if we do not think of the other as another self, we will not see the other as separate from ourselves. You and I cannot be ethical towards each other, he tells us, unless we can make the distinction between you and me. This respect for difference between self and other is necessary for an ethical relationship to emerge from our conversation. . |
| 4. The call to responsibility is always a singular response in which
'one must seek a new (post-deconstructive) determination of the
responsibility of the 'subject' (Derrida, 1991, p.105). The question of the subject remains problematic because of eithcs. The self is not liquidated but 're-inscribed' in a reworking of Descarte's 'cogito ergo sum' into: 'you are, therefore I am'. A person is not an arbitrary product of discourse but a complexity constituted by self 'and' other. There are persons in conversation! A narrative is an existential as ell as a social text of a life history of a person. people tell their 'own' stories in the context of the stories of others. The discursive self can still say to itself 'I doubt', which takes us to the beginning of Descartes method, not the end."n That is, the discursive self is still capable of self-reflection. That persons are dialogical and relational beings does not nullify self-consciousness, as the capacity to reflect on inner experience, for example, of one's body, emotions, thoughts, dreams, and so on. The self is able to reflect upon itself 'because' it is constituted by discourse. The self is present to itself by being in-dialogue-with others. It is the dialogical self which makes he self-reflective movement possible. |
4. Again, the call to responsibility is not a call
to deconstruct the centered self. Rather, it is a post-deconstruction
call to establish the centered self in order to be be responsible to others.
This leaves the self problematic in Derrida's ethics.The self is not liquidated;
it is revised so that it becomes centered. This results in a reworking
of the notion and experience self. The post-deconstructive
self does not arise randomly as an arbitrary product of conversation
but is created by that conversation which produces the division between
self and other. For this to happen, the text we create in conversation
is seen as attached to the author. We are not anonymous in this post-deconstructive
conversation. Our meaning is tied to our being particular people
creating these passages.
This post-deconstructive centered self is existential self in Sartre's sense. This self-construction is not merely a the passive result of our having a life story to tell. This new self constructs itself with agency. Such a centered post-deconstructive self, however, is quite able to reflect on its inner experience, its body, dreams, emotions and so on and to doubt their reality. It can do this because this sense of a centered self emerges and revises itself through conversation with others. It says things like, "Perhaps this is me" it says, "no, I think this is you." |
| 5. What this suggests is that agency is a story of the individual in a space between persons. Narrative destiny as a both/and deconstructive complexity is both individual and collective. The ontology here is not the individual or the social but both/and. Self/other have meaning in relation to each other. Persons are also moments in-between converations with others. These are occasions for self-dialogue or introspection if only as a talking with others in the realm of imagination. The internal dialogue of individual selves is nested within the conversation between persons as semiotic process (Wiley, 1994). In other words, relational selves in postmodern culture may not be as dispersed, fragmented or 'saturated' (Gergen, 1991) as we think. Even socially constructed narratives express an individual identity and destiny that constitute persons. That we are immersed in langauge and relationships does not rule out a unified story of self. This is in accord with Harre's (1995) less radical social constructionism, which allows for universals and the necessity of persons, if only in 'core langauge games' of a moral and embodied kind.' There is a repetition, stability and coherence to human personality in the midst of change and difference. The self is both centred and ex-centric, dispersed in relationship and language and gathered together, all in a narrative as destiny. | 5. Derrida is suggesting, then, that for the sense
of personal agency to emerge we must see ourselves as individuals relating.
This does not destroy the collective. We are both selves and collective.
And our selfhood exists not only in relationship to others but in the moments
in which we are alone engaging in in introspection, self-reflection and
internal dialogue. In fact, this ongoing internal conversation lays
down the groundwork (in a semiotic process) for our agency and ethics.In
other words, relational selves in postmodern culture may not be as dispersed,
fragmented or 'saturated' (Gergen, 1991) as we
think. Even socially constructed narratives express an individual
identity and destiny that allow us to be persons and have a unified
life story.
Derrida, therefore, is now painting a picture of the self that is in accord with Harre's (1995) less radical social constructionism. This individual self may be restricted to the 'core langauge games' concerned with morality related to our bodies. But here, at least, there is repetition and stability in our personalities and experience and this centeredness exists amidst change and difference. And, so, this post-deconstructed self is both centred and dispersed -- and all of this takes place within a narrative of destiny. |
Derrida, J. (1981). Positions. Chicaago, IL: Uniersity of Chicago Press.
Derrida, J. (1984). My chances. In J. H. Smith & W. Kerrigan (Eds.). Taking Chances: Derrida, Psychoanalysis and Literature. Baltimore, MD/London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Derrida, J. (1987) The postcard:; From Socrates to Freud and beyond, trans. Alan Bass. Chicago, Il: The University of Chicago Press.
Derrida, J. (1988), The politics of friendshi. Journal of Philosophy, 85(11), 632-644.
Derrida, J. (1991). 'Eating well': An interview. In E. Cadava, P. Connor, & J. L. Nancy (Eds.), Who comes after the subject? London/ New York: Routledge.
Gergen, K. (1991). The saturated self. new York: Basic Books.
Harre, R. (1995). The necessity of personhood as embodied being. Theory & Psychology, 5, 369-373.
Sampson, E. E. (1989b). The deconstruction of the self. In J. Shotter & K. J. Gergen (Eds.), Texts of identity. London: Sage.
Smith, R. (1995). Derrida and autobiography.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wiley, N. (1994). The semiotic self. Cambridge:
Polity press.
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