11/28/98
Lois
Holzman and Fred
Newman
Response to Parker
There is much to comment on regarding Ian Parker's
"Against Postmodernism," an article which
appears in the most recent issue of Theory & Psychology.
Inseparable from the substantive issues he presents relative to Marxism,
postmodernism and power are quite serious problems concerning the logic
of
his argument and misrepresentations and distortions of the positions
of many
postmodern psychologists and philosophers he discusses. We will be
commenting on these issues at a later time. For now, we confine our
response
to the issue of power, not as an abstraction in the manner in which
Parker
raises it, but in life-as-lived - both in the university and outside
of it.
There's more than a bit of irony in the fact that, in an essay so concerned
with a radical Marxist agenda, Parker exhibits a complete lack of
self-reflection about how he might be impacted on by his own bourgeois
location, the university. Both his posture as the official Marxist
and his
commitment to Marxism as an epistemology (and, thereby, his stature
as the
official knower) have their roots in his academic position. Universities
bestow power (perhaps, more accurately, authority) on those they hire
to
function as official knowers. In all too many instances, those academics
who
consider themselves Marxists, radicals or revolutionaries appear to
be
shockingly oblivious to the implications that their institutional location
has on their thinking ('critical' or otherwise). Among the things that
an
academic location appears to do is make it exceedingly difficult to
recognize differences between work within the academy and work carried
out
in other contexts. Parker's article embodies this unself-reflective
institutional bias.
His portrayal of and attitude toward our twenty-plus year non-university-based
practice exemplifies this. It is another page in the story of
the
unwillingness of the psychological establishment (especially the
left/progressive establishment) to look seriously at things that are
outside
the official institutions of knowing (see Holzman,
in press). His critique
of our work is made under the pretext that we are just like him, that
ours
is just another bona fide institution. But Parker knows better than
this. He
and we have a decade-long political/intellectual relationship and he
is well
aware of our unique independent institutional location. That we are
a
different sort of historical phenomenon than he is has been the topic
of
many fruitful discussions among us, both in print (see Parker,
1995 and
Holzman, 1995) and out.
Just how different are we from Parker? The
institutions and community which
we, along with hundreds of others, have brought into existence and
nurtured
these past decades (the East Side Institute for Short Term Psychotherapy,
the East Side Center for Social Therapy and its affiliated therapy
centers
in other US cities, the Castillo Theatre, the All Stars Talent Show
Network,
the Development School for Youth, the Community Literacy Research Project,
Inc. and the Committee for a Unified Independent Party) are not funded,
controlled or validated by any government institution or university.
They
weren't built with government grants or taxpayers' money, but
through years
of standing on street corners and knocking on doors, asking ordinary
people
to support independent, progressive psychology, culture and politics.
No one
learned about our work in a college text or university lecture, but
from our
community organizing. Our institutions don't function according to
the
hierarchical structure of traditional institutions. Our training center,
the
East Side Institute, gives no grades, degrees or tenure. Our therapy
centers
do not diagnose and there are no rules (implicit or explicit) against
clients socializing with other clients or therapists. The All Stars
Talent
Show Network, our youth development organization, produces talent shows
at
which everyone who auditions gets into the show. Everyone connected
with
the Castillo Theatre, including the actors, producers, set designers,
etc.
serve on the house staff when the house is open. The radically democratic
collectivity we have built emerged as an inseparable part of what we
were
building, and it continues to evolve. Rooted in the dialectic relationship
being/ becoming, our 'business' is creating becoming. Parker is in
the
business of critiquing what is.
At a minimum, Parker should have made note of these differences instead
of
lumping our work with that of academics for his critique. But he didn't,
and
instead treats us as if we were part of the university system instead
of a
group of people who self-consciously tried to create a research environment
as free as possible of the biases of the official institution of knowing.
It
doesn't follow from our intentions or practice that we've succeeded,
but it
does follow that any honest and serious analysis of our work needs
to take
this into account from the very beginning.
Parker's failure to do so leads him to make some fairly serious blunders,
given his moral/political commitment as a Marxist. Take, for example,
his
critique of our collectivism. Parker says,
| For some writers, including those who are sympathetic to Marxist ideas
(e.g., Newman & Holzman, 1997), postmodernism
invites a form of relational politics which embeds 'selves' in social context
and encourages collective action. There is a problem, though, with their
collective vision of an 'end of knowing' which automatically discredits
those who would think that it must be possible to find a place to step
back and assess things. ...It seems that Newman
& Holzman (1997) risk celebrating that very absence of 'critical
distance' which Jameson (1984a) identified as
a problem in postmodernism...
|
Parker sidesteps entirely the crucial question of where one steps back
to.
It's not 'stepping back' that we discredit; it's stepping back to (hiding
out in) the authoritarian structure of the university that we reject.
We
would think this would be a pretty standard position for a Marxist
to take.
Apparently not, since Parker, as the official Marxist legitimated by
his
tenured position (while we are merely 'sympathetic to Marxist ideas')
doesn't. Again, it's disturbing to us that Parker ignores what he knows
-
that collectivism was never an abstract issue for us, but was part
of our
activity from the beginning. The particular forms it has taken over
the
years developed inseparable from the process of creating what we have
created.
We do not understand collectivism superficially as people coming together,
which is what Parker implies as he goes on to describe an even worse
danger
of collectivism: "The pitfalls of collectivism in postmodernism
pale into
insignificance, however, when we discover what it has spawned, in a
powerful
strain of individualism" (p. 620). His characterization follows.
The rhetorical trick which appears time and again through the celebration
of open dialogue in postmodern discourse is that when everything is up
for grabs, those who are stronger will be the winners, and those who appeal
to consensual taken-for-granted starting points in analysis, historical
understanding or moral standpoint are positioned as those who are susceptible
to what Nietzsche (1977) calls 'slave mentality.'
There are plenty of postmodern psychologists who value dialogue, but when
the ground rules for the dialogue are repeatedly eroded, all that is left
is a battle of wills. This discourse thus incites individualism, smuggling
it in through
the back door while it appears to simply celebrate perspectivism and
appeals to the motif of uncertainty.
|
In 1995 Parker published an article in which
he critically examined
published articles that attacked our organizations as a 'cult' and
one of us
(Newman) as a 'guru.' Dismissing these charges, Parker gave his own
critical
assessment of social therapy, including his worry over the potential
danger
of authoritarianism within our organizations (in other words, we had
'cult-like' tendencies). By critiquing our work within the pages of
Theory &
Psychology, Parker is now giving us the validation of an official academic
institution. At the same time, we find this critique to be little
more than
the same cult charge dressed up in fancy language.
Even if we were to grant the logic of his argument (which we don't),
it
seems to us that 'a battle of the wills' is better than the hegemony
of the
university - it's emancipatory relative to the authoritarian institution
of
knowing. To claim otherwise is really to self-servingly proclaim oneself
more valid (by virtue of being the officially-sanctioned keeper of
knowledge
and moral authority) than the people. To do so in the name of Marx
is
remarkable. We wonder if this whole argument reduces to mere pragmatism:
"If
everything's up for grabs, will I lose my job?"
Other academics have had the same worry about postmodernism. For example,
Louis
Menand, a professor of humanities at City University of New York, has
warned of the dangers postmodernism poses to the future of American
liberal
education (Menand, 1995). Our discussion of
Menand's pragmatism in The End of Knowing (the book which Parker puts forth
as the basis for his critique
of us), is helpful here, for he too uses a critique of postmodernism
to
defend his position as an official knower. To his credit, Menand honestly
and forthrightly presents his pragmatic self-interest. Pointing
out that
the postmodernists' criticism of traditional forms of knowledge undermines
the university as the officially-sanctioned location of knowledge and
takes
away its reason for being; without that, he says, "I think people will
worry
what they're paying for" (p. 143). He continues,
The problem is, to put it crudely, a marketing one...If we say universities
are places where academics possess knowledge about the world - indeed,
in many respects, possess a monopoly on knowledge about the world - and
they
will impart this knowledge to you for a fee, which you may pay in taxes
or tuition, then you can decide that the knowledge is worth acquiring and
pay to support the knowers.
|
Parker is not a neo-liberal pragmatist like Menand. He is a Marxist
critic
of the university who gets all the benefits of being validated by the
university. We have no problem with this, except when it leads him
to forget
or distort who we are.
References
Holzman, L. (1995). "Wrong," said Fred. A response
to Parker. Changes, An International Journal of Psychology and Psychotherapy,
13, 1, 23-26.
Holzman, L. (Ed.), (in press). Introduction.
Performing Psychology: A
Postmodern Culture of the Mind. New York: Routledge.
Jameson, F. (1984). Postmodernism, or
the cultural logic of late capitalism. New Left Review. 146,
53-92.
Menand, L. (1995). Marketing postmodernism.
In R. Orrill, Ed., The
Condition of American Liberal Education: Pragmatism and a Changing
Tradition. New York: College Entrance Examination Board.
Newman, F and Holzman, L. (1997). The End
of Knowing: A New, Developmental Way of Learning. London: Routledge.
Nietzsche, F. (1977). A Nietzsche
Reader. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
(citation from in Parker (1988).)
Parker, I. (1995). "right", said Fred, "I'm
too sexy for bourgeois group
therapy": the case of the Institute for Social Therapy. Changes,
An
International Journal of Psychology and Psychotherapy, 13(1),
1-22.
Parker, I. (1998). Against postmodernism:
Psychology in cultural context.
Theory & Psychology, (8,5), 601-627.
Also see:
PMTH
NEWS articles on Parker's article.
Review of
End of Knowing by Tom Strong
Response
to Tom Strong's review by Holzman and Newman
And see PMTH articles on Holzman and Newman:
Lyotardian
Paganism and Holzman and Newman
On
the End of Knowing
More
on newman & Holzman's Social Therapy |