Lois Shawver's 
summary of 
Kenneth Gergen's 
Social psychology and the Wrong Revolution
 

More and more I am convinced how hard Kenneth Gergen has worked to try to maintain the distinction between social constructionism and constructivism.  That is what this long paper that I am summarizing is all about. 

Constructivism, Gergen explains,  is cognitivism, and cognitivism leads to solipsism or mentalism and the belief that everything we think we see and know is a figment of our imaginations.  From this constructivist position, Gergen  says "It is not the world as it is that determines action, but one's cognitions about the world [that determines what we do]."  In fact, if we go all the way to solipsism, he continues, the world is not involved at all.  It is all just a dream.   For the consructivist who takes the logic of constructivism all the way, people don't really have problems, they just think they do.  Moreover, the people that they think are causing them problems, do not necessarily exist.  The world doesn't necessarily exist.  Everything might be in the mind (solipism).  Gergen says: 
 

Understandably, most cognitivists have wished to stop short of the conclusion of solipsism (466).

But, Gergen thinks,  stopping short of solipsism is for constructivists hard to do.  The logic of constructivism leads straight into solipsism, and that means it leads into all kinds of unpleasant paradoxes.  It leads eventually to the conclusion that the client is merely a product of the therapist's mind.  Moreover, constructivism undercuts itself by concluding that the constructivist theory is also just figment of our imagination. 

Constructivism, Gergen saying, is simply the wrong revolution.  He can almost hear the words of future critic of constructivist anti-realism (cf., Barbara Held, 1995), and he is eager to dissociate himself from its problemsto come.  Constructionism, he insists, is different from constructivism.  Constructionism is the right revolution.  Forget constructivism, he urges us, at least for now. 

Gergen says: 
 

Let us ... suspend concern with the unyielding problems of how mind and world are related.  We need not cast these concerns aside indefinitely.  Rather, if we bracket such issues for the time being, we are free to labour in an orchard where the fruits lie within more immediage grasp (p.471).
Well, Gergen brackets these concerns for the whole paper.  Why does he want us to do that?  Because constructivism is illogical?  What does constructionism have to offer that is better?  He offers several things: 

First, he tells us, it will allow us to talk about the social and political implications of various practices, of ways of talking.  He trots out Carol Gilligan's remarkable 1982 study that showed how Kohlberg's theory of moral development was insidiously biased in favor of males.  And he trots out people like Wallach and Wallach (1983) who argued that much psychological theory sanctions selfishness.  Notice, he says to us, how this gives us practical kinds of information.  It helps us become aware of how our ordinary daily ways of doing things is affecting things and gives us a clue as to how we might change things. 

Second, Gergen tells us, social constructionism will allow us to notice that things are different in different cultures whereas constructivism presumes that "contemporary research is of universal implication."  If we realize our research is tapping different cultures, you see, then we can compare and imagine what we might do to make our own culture better.  Again, there are practical implications here for helping us improve our lives. 

And, finally, and perhaps most importantly, Gergen tells us that social constructionism will help us envision better and more satisfying ways to relate to each other.  Here he reminds us of John Shotter's theory of joint-action.  And Gergen says:: 
 

The invitation (of social constructionism) is, that ...[we] treat social relatedness (as opposed to isolated minds) as a reality of preeminent significance (478).

And, that takes us full circle.  After all, according to Gergen, when constructivism takes itself seriously it becomes a solipsism, and we are trying to study isolated minds.  That means everyone is simply imagining everyone else.  With social constructionism, on the other hand, you investigate how people relate to each other, what makes some families thrive,  what makes couple relationships satisfying . 

And "Isn't that better?" he is saying, than being a constructivist?  Constructivists can only desperately try to look inside the privacy of other people's minds while believing, if they are able to be consistent, that they are only imagining that the other person even exists.  Sounds like arche critic Barbara Held's criticism of postmodernism (including social constructionism), does it not? 

In fact, has arche critic of postmodernism, Barbara Held, even heard of Kenneth Gergen?  Well, yes she has, but she treats him as one of the constructivists just like Gergen feared (see 1995, p.186-187) and she does not cite this particular paper, Social psychology and the wrong revolution.  Maybe she did not even read it. 

Held, Barbara S. (1995).  Back to Reality: A Critique of Postmodern Theory. New York: Norton. 

Gergen, K. J. (1989). Social psychology and the wrong revolution. European Journal of Social Psychology, 19, 463-484. 

Gilligan, C. (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development, Harvard Univresity Press, Cambridge, Ma. 

Wallach, M. and Wallach, L. (1983).  Psychology's Sanction for Selfishness.  San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co.