Prelude: War of the Words 

In considering how to position my response to Barbara's paper I  find myself facing a potential paradigmatic dilemma or paradox. If I present arguments against Barbara's claims about postmodernism being antirealist and relativistic, my attempts to disagree may actually justify and prove her points (i.e. to prove a realist posture wrong is a very realistic activity). An engagement in this type of dialogue, while at first glance appearing to be oppositional, actually moves me to a similar world view, as we debate different truths and facts.  This type of conversation could muddy the waters. Yet, if I respond from a postmodern perspective, I risk that this may seem to be more of the same to Barbara and not add to our scholarly exchange. However, as I do agree with Bakhtin's view (see Morson & Emerson, 1990) that a successful conversation is a project that is messy and requires a lot of work, I hope that this labor is productive. 

Like Barbara, I am a therapist and researcher.  Interestingly, we are also both inspired by postmodern ideas, but in very different manners. I am provoked because of postmodern ideas while Barbara is provoked at postmodern ideas: sometimes for the same reasons!  As noted by Barbara, "antirealism can hardly be said to lurk in some harmless philosophical background."   Indeed, this is a contention shared by Foucault as post-structural critiques highlight the lack 
of innocence of all discourses (meaning systems) as we cannot control the effects and outcomes of ideas. Our two chapters are not innocent. In this respect, I hope to be mindful of what characterizations this text may produce about the ideas discussed. My goal is to set some of the ideas I understand Barbara to be 
presenting back into play (Spivak, 1976) (some of which I agree with) as well as to present differing views about postmodernism ideas.   A  caveat is that this response presents my current understanding of postmodernism ideas and does not claim to be a voice for the views of others. 

For me the relevant thrust of postmodern is the belief that our understanding and thus the meaning of the world is continuously negotiated (and contested) through our communications with others in larger orders of social conversations (Gale & Kogan, 1996-1997). The strengths of my claims are a function of my writing and rhetorical linguistic abilities, and are not based on a objective (context free) or essential facts. It is up to you the reader, to take these ideas (from both chapters) and to make sense or nonsense of them in your own way. 

Part I:  A Postmodern Twist 

I found myself captured by the world of brief therapy that Barbara introduced. An orderly and uncluttered tale is presented that gives us a compelling grand narrative of the nature of brief therapy and its three (sometimes four) defining objectives. Using selected quotes from Haley, de Shazer and Weakland based on two 
interviews with Michael Hoyt and several publications we discover the true nature of brief therapy.  I had previously assumed (in error, according to the frame provided by Barbara) that the history of brief therapy was quite haphazard and discontinuous in its development (Gale & Long, 1995). The messy history that I present in my classes bring in events like Bateson's suggestion (probably 
direct rather than indirect) to Haley and Weakland to go to Phoenix to study with that interesting man Milton Erickson. Erickson's profound influence (through practice and demonstration rather than theoretical arguments) on these two men (as well as many others) led them to consider phenomena like trance, utilization, ratification, paradox, change, story, metaphor, minimal cues, and much, much more. These practices pushed Haley and Weakland, and later Jackson, 
Watzlawick, and Fisch (and again the list goes on) to experiment and try new clinical activities. In the development of these ideas and practices, various (sometimes messy) interpersonal struggles occurred between players. Funding stopped on the VA research on schizophrenic families. MRI was established. Haley moved to the East coast. In Milwaukee, a brief therapy center was established. The Milan group immersed themselves with the writings of MRI. 

In the 80's, epistemologists Ernst von Glasersfeld and Heinz von Foerester and biologists Humberto Maturana and Alberto Verela began contributing to the philosophical foundations of some of these clinical movements. Erickson's legacy was challenging multitudes and changing clinical practices. Social psychologists Ken Gergen and John Shotter were presenting alternative philosophies for some 
therapists. Tom Anderson in Norway developed an approach called the reflecting team. Managed care came along and embraced the brevity of brief therapy and many therapists capitalized upon the connection as other clinical disciplines discovered brief therapy and developed clinical protocols. Through all these (and so many other) events, what brief therapy was and is, is continuously being defined and redefined both in literature and in practice by many therapists. Even this rather messy story cannot contain the possible realities of the development of brief therapy. I am disturbed that it too is a select narrative highlighting charismatic white males (see Luepnitz, 1988). 

Perhaps brief therapy and its key principles is better accounted for in researching the practices of the clinicians who do brief therapy (Gale & Newfield, 1992; Kogan & Gale, 1997; Kogan, in press) rather than through brief statements of three key proponents of brief therapy at one point in time. I do not believe it is possible 
to capture the fundamentals of a major approach of therapy from these types of descriptions particularly when people's ideas change over time as well.  I suspect that many different world views are driving brief (or time limited) therapists's articulation of his or her theory (see Homrich & Horne, in press).  While various accounts or lists of components can suggest (or re-present) how some 
clinicians are understanding and practicing their craft, these stories do not and cannot correspond to an entire group of clinicians as if to provide a reality correction. No single grand narrative can encompass the meaning of this much activity and expertise (Brunner, 1986). 

Barbara's chapter presents her ideas, through a carefully crafted discourse, to present one view of brief therapy. As readers, we are rhetorically persuaded to shift from our problematic brief therapy narrative to her unproblematic one. In post-structural theory, this constructive function of language is a focus. Through 
discourse, ideas that are meaningful, interesting, coherent, and captivating persuade the reader/listener to re-think (re-story) her or his ideas which informs behaviors in context. In her chapter, Barbara uses language to lead the reader to another reality meaning for brief therapy. For example, on page 3 Barbara notes "there is 
good agreement among our three leaders about the first three defining objectives of brief therapy." Her statement that "there is good agreement" ratifies the three (carefully) selected quotes from three authors (described as "leaders" implying that we know them well) to prove her point and strengthen her argument (ratification 
is a useful rhetorical device also used to deepen a trance). Her ability to convince the reader through the rhetorical strength of her story ironically illustrates a postmodern aspect of her paper. 

Another example is Barbara's discussion about realism and antirealism.  Indeed, to evoke the term "antirealist" is a powerful linguistic move. This naming creates a dichotomy with a preferred and dispreferred distinction. Barbara's statement that 
"postmodernism in particular ... necessitates an antirealist or constructivist epistemology" bonds antirealism with postmodernism. Linking postmodernism with antirealism (many postmodernist therapists and theorists talk about being anti-essentialist not anti- realists) (linking is also another useful technique in trance work) achieves the function of identifying postmodernism in a very 
specific manner that is more easily criticized. Antirealism is used throughout Barbara's chapter, and achieves an alternative story about postmodernism than what many postmodern writers strive to present. 

PART II: Postmodernism, Post-Structuralism and Relativism

Scene I: Revisiting Realism/Antirealism: In reading Barbara's paper, I was fascinated by the claims that as being influenced by postmodernism I must also be an antirealist. Having recently backed into a friend's car on the drive way, and paid for the repairs, I see myself as quite realistic (though sometimes not always 
coordinated). In wondering about her claims of realism, and wondering who, in particular, holds to a realist claim as put forth by Barbara, I decided to revisit my graduate school research methods text by Fred Kerlinger (1973), Foundations of Behavioral Research 
(2nd edition). In his chapter on Foundations of Measurements, Kerlinger stated, "We say we measure objects, but this is not quite true. We measure the properties of the characteristics, of these objects. Even this qualification is not quite true, however. We actually measure indicants of the property of objects, so that when 
we say we measure objects we are really saying that we measure indicants of the properties of objects. This is generally true of all science ...." (italics in original) (pp. 431-432).  Both researchers and practitioners alike continuously struggle over what is an indicant of an object. This does not mean that Kerlinger is an 
antirealist, but that many scientists and researchers and clinicians are troubled by how we come to know and understand reality. 

However, Barbara argues that constructivism and social constructionism are both antirealist epistemologies which deny reality. As noted above, this naming is a powerful rhetorical device. But what claims do various postmodern theories make about knowing reality? What I pose is that various postmodern and post- 
structural  perspectives are "exploring the various ways in which [realities are] constructed and undermined" (Potter, 1996, p. 7). These theories are not aimed at denying the existence of various objects (antirealism), but rather, critically examine how fact production is performed and achieved. An activity that is also quite 
common in therapy. 

Scene II: I Never Met a Narrative I Didn't Read: Early in her chapter, Barbara notes that she has found "a common theme" based on her readings of postmodernism. Later in the paper she also notes that post-structuralism and postmodernism mean the same thing.  What I would like to suggest is that postmodern and post-structural approaches are not easily defined nor collapsed together (Butler, 1992). Depending on various writers, such as Jacques Derrida, 
Michael Foucault, Jean-Francis Lyotard, Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as others, very different views and critical activities are elucidated. These various views do question what is meant by knowledge and reality and examine how meaning is produced in context, but in very different approaches. It may be that Barbara's 
concerns are not with postmodern theories per se, but rather, with how some writers talk about how they use postmodern ideas in their clinical practice. If this is indeed an issue for Barbara, I too share this concern. 

Our talk and words do things (Austin, 1962). The postmodern claim that language and meaning is constitutive and has real effects on people's lives is neither an ontological realist nor antirealist position.  It is through our social interactions that meaning is continuously produced, contested, changed or maintained. The words 
of this chapter as well are functioning in the world of discourse to present ideas for the reader to consider. 

As an example of how words are used, consider the phrase "keen observation" used by Barbara in her second objective. This objective is used to demonstrate the necessary linkage of brief therapy to a realist epistemology.  Barbara's first concise statement of her second objective begins with the notion of "careful observers who listen" (crediting Weakland's comments about Erickson being "curious," "a hell of an observer," and "he looked and listened to other people" as the source for this concept). 

On the next page as Barbara works to clarify her objectives,  "careful observers" is rewritten as brief therapists who "strive to observe clients keenly--listen carefully." In the very next paragraph, the second objective is now reformulated as therapists 
"relying upon the keen observations of each client." Finally on page 15 the last iteration of her second objective is restated as "keen empirical observation of each client." I use these examples to show that there is a lot of (seen but probably unnoticed) work going on to persuade the reader to develop the idea of "keen empirical observation" from "careful observation." In this way Barbara 
constructs, through language, her reality. Part of the success of this realist story is to create a shared understanding of what is meant by "observing others."  What I want to suggest is that there are alternative understandings of this notion of objective observations. 

Scene III: Relativism:  This discursive view of understanding the world is not a relativist view that everything is equally acceptable nor that all texts are the same. As Derrida (1972) notes, his phrase that there is "nothing outside of text" merely means "that one cannot refer to this  real' except in an interpretive 
experience" (p. 148).  In other words, meaning of individuals' actions can only be made sense of in context. Keeping therapy individualized (as Barbara supports) suggests  attending to the contextual embeddeness of clients' lives: which is a goal of postmodern approaches. 

Descriptions do not only represent a world, but accomplish various agendas.  This does not mean that any text is as good as another text. We live in complicated weave of embedded texts. Our communities and social relationships provide contexts of understanding as our texts simultaneously shape our communities and 
culture.  This view does acknowledge constraints and restraints: not based on absolute reality claims, but based on discursive contexts. 

Part III: The usual suspects: MRI, Solution Focused and Narrative? 

In assembling the characters of this story, I was somewhat confused how narrative was cast. Is it because that this model is influenced by postmodern theories? Maybe it is because some people have talked about narrative therapy as if it were a brief therapy approach. While I appreciate the postmodern influence on this approach as noted by Michael White, Jill Freedman, Gene Combs, Jeff 
Zimmerman, Vicki Dickerson and others, narrative therapy is neither necessarily brief nor presented as a brief therapy approach by these authors. Also, Michael White and David Epston (1990) do not credit the brief strategic therapy movement (as stated by Barbara) for the development of narrative therapy. Actually, I began wondering what exactly is meant by "brief therapy." Is it based on the number of 
sessions one sees a client? Is it based on the avowed orientation of the therapist? Is it based on the jacket cover of a book? Is it based on the advertisement as noted in the phone book or brochures/cards for a therapist?  I wonder if the meaning of "brief" is not socially determined such that it serves particular purposes. 
When and how the term brief is utilized in a conversation does something in that conversation. 

Narrative therapy tends to emphasize knowledges/stories of culture, race, gender, sexual orientation (and more) which cultural/societal communities engage in to give meaning, shape, encourage, and marginalize lives and relationships between people. This approach presents very different clinical actions than MRI and Solution Focused therapy (see Kogan & Gale, in press).  Indeed, to place proponents of these three schools in the same room would likely lead to some degree of difference on theory and practice (as has been the case!). 

Perhaps Barbara is raising the point that there are more similarities than differences between these three approaches. While my response can not address this issue, I do think that this question is worthy of further discussion and research. 

Part IV: As Good as it Gets: The Morale of our play. 

From my reading of Barbara's chapter, I suspect that one of Barbara's concerns is that of accountability.  What is a therapist's responsibility for change and influence? What does collaboration mean in practice? What are the implications of one's theory and world view on one's practice? Barbara makes the claim that 
postmodernism is not necessary for doing brief therapy. I agree! It is not necessary. Many brief therapists do not evoke postmodernism in their theory of change. But this does not mean that postmodern views can not also make a difference in how a therapist practices his or her craft. As I have tried to allude to earlier, I strongly believe that postmodern views can and do make a difference in 
clinical practice. 

I suspect that Barbara's concerns are more with how some people are using postmodern ideas to justify their clinical practices rather than with postmodernism approaches.  I agree with Barbara statement that one's theory does not "lurk in some harmless philosophical background."  This is true of all theories and world 
views including realism, and is what postmodern and post-structural approaches critically consider: How knowledge is produced and used have consequences on people's lives and sense of meaning. Most postmodern and post-structural approaches consider the reflexive practices involved in one's own production of meaning. However, when one evokes postmodernism to justify his/her clinical work, rather than reflexively practicing these ideas, I share Barbara's concerns. 
Without critically considering one's own practices in shaping the conversation, postmodernism gets reduced to a utterance that has few implications for one's therapy. It is at this point that postmodernism is not necessary for conducting brief therapy and therapist's actions are at risk for causing harm.  Doing therapy 
(brief or otherwise), even striving for a collaborative posture, is not an innocent activity. One needs to be accountable in his or her activities, and this is where I strongly  resonate with postmodern ideas.  Too many issues of power and manipulation are made invisible by one's theoretical positions. While one can never be outside of context nor not shaping interactions, postmodern and post-structural 
ideas do provide a method for examining how these  these practices 
are conducted. 

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