| Summary paraphrase by Peter Rober
of Relational Responsibility Resources for sustainable dialogue. London: Sage Publications (1999). |
| In their new book McNamee & Gergen attempt to transform the concept
of responsibility. They replace traditional approaches that place the individual
center stage and replace it with meaning building in a relational process. They characterize the individualist tradition as one that treats relationships as artificial and oppressive. Then, they offer a way of talking that emphasizes relational process, and they try to remove the thrall of individualist discourse. Simultaneously, they try to move beyond the objectification of relationships as merely the antithesis of an objetification of individuals. Mc Namee & Gergen don't want to essentialize individuals nor relationships, but they are trying to create conversational opportunities that facilitate our getting on in the world of enormous and ever changing complexity. The book is structured as a dialogue. In Part I the authors examine relational responsibility in theory and practice. They also confront their ideas with the delicate problem of child sexual abuse. Part II contains the comments from scholars, therapists and other practitioners (Harlene Anderson, Karl Tomm, Sallyann Roth, John Shotter, to name to most famous names). Part III is a response of McNamee and Gergen to Part II. In this summary paraphrase, I present an account of Part I: Relational
Responsibility, which has three chapters:
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| 1. An Invitation to Relational Responsibility
The major discourse of responsibility is one in which the single individual serves as the critical terminus. It is to individuals that blame and credit are assigned (p.3). This discourse of responsibility is rooted in the Western belief in the self as an originary source and the belief in subjective agency (a capacity for internal deliberation and control of one's actions). However, this discourse is problematic. First, there is a widespread discontent in philosophy, social psychology, anthropology, and social sciences with the idea that the individual should form the basisfor action. See for instance the postmodern philosophies, social constructionism. Second, there also "an increasing dissatisfaction with the societal ramifications of traditional individualism" (p.8). This concern shows itself in the following complaints: * There is concern about the way this individualist assumption affects
Intelligibilities of Relationship (p. 10) We are not proposing the full abandonment of the individualist ideology. We want to develop new forms of intelligibilities that invite, encourage or suggest alternative forms of action. "Can we locate traditions of intelligibility in which relatedness (as opposed to individuality) holds a central place?" Let us now consider four potent forms of relational intelligibility as they have emerged in the scholarly world: 1. internal others
These four domains of intelligibility all stand as alternatives to the accounts of individual responsibility. 1. Internal Others (p.12) Some forms of intelligibility view "the individual as embodying aspects of others." (p.9) This framework suggests that our individuality is constituted by our interaction others. For instance, Vygotsky saw individual thought as the reflection of social process. All that can be thought is first present within social interchange. For instance, Mikael Bahktin said we are multi-voiced because we are each exposed to multiple domains of language use and because language itself is a composite of multiple influences. We interact with others and take them inside us, psychologically, internal otehrs. Our understanding of internal others invites us "to explore the myriad identities at play and rest." (p.12) We may ask our clients, who is speaking? Who is listening? What voices are not being heard? and so on -- even though all of these voices are speaking through the client's mouth. 2. Conjoint Relations (p.13) Some authors draw our attention to patterned interaction among two or more persons. Shotter for instance speaks of "joint-action", when he refers to relational patterns in which each of the constituent actions depends for its intelligibility on the other (example sexual intercourse). Similarly, Gergen (1994) showed how "actions in themselves have no meaning; they acquire meaning only as they are supplemented by the actions of others." (p.14) Conjoint relationships, however, may simplify the situation -- because o understand conjoint relations is is typically necessary to consider the broader community. As we construct meanings together with other individuals, we are also always dealing with other relationships in which we are engaged. "Thus for any action that is blameworthy in a given relationship, there are silent interlocutors who look on approvingly. We must be prepared to ask, in what other relationships is this action an honorable move? How does it make its way into the present relationship? If we do not recognize this action as sanctioned within some other relationship - if we punish or obliterate it - what other relationship (of which we are a part) will be injured as a result?" (p.14) 3. Relations among Groups (p.15) The language that helps us understand relationships among individuals can also be employed to describe or explain relationships among collective units (groups, nations, teams, families,…). Examples: "America's friendship for France …" or "the government asked the population…" or "the company believes it is its duty …". "These languages of group interaction are valuable resources in moving from rituals of individual blame into the relational sphere." (p.15) They make it possible to speak of someone's actions as a manifestation of a collectivity. "Furthermore, we may be prepared to understand our construction of another's actions in term of the larger institutions by which we are constituted. For example, we may see that the very act that we term "theft" is so by virtue of our privileged place in the class structure, and that within the framework of those engaged in action, its definition may be self-preservation or, alternatively, a form of heroism." (p.15) 4. Systemic Process (p.16) Systemic processes are discourses that give rise to images of full relatedness, all to all. For instance, von Bertalanffy's general systems theory.
This systemic view on relatedness augment the dialogues of responsibility in a major way, both generally and specifically. * Generally, if we are all part of a systemic totality, we are
drawn to
A Process of Relational Responsibility (p.18) Is it possible to describe practices that could be considered relationally responsible? McNamee and Gergen tell us: "We hold relational responsible actions to be those that sustain and enhance forms of interchange out of which meaningful action itself is made possible. If human meaning is generated through relationship, then to be responsible to relational processes is to favor the possibility of intelligibility itself -of possessing selves, values, and the sense of worth. Isolation represents the negation of humanity." (p.18-19) Perhaps, we can think in terms of relational responsibility. Some practices seem promising. Consider orienting practices. This is a set of theoretical intelligibilities that may help us position conversational participants "so as to generate alternative ways of viewing action, open new domains of curiosity and provoke catalytic question." (p.19) This might be considereda form of relational responsibility. Consider the following suggestions of relational responsibility: * Relationships serve as the major source of what we take to be "the
* Personal identity (motive, character, intention, action) is a by-product
of negotiations within relationships.
* In the same way that personal identity is realized within relationships,
* Persons represent the intersection of multiple relationships.
* Conflict and disharmony are a natural and inevitable outcome of
* Each determination of the real and the good is simultaneously a
This is a strong argument for promoting a process of relational responsibility. Problems are not fixed; today's unbearable action, may ultimately be seen as a developmental phase. A process of relational responsibility disturbs the patterns giving rise to present anguish. Furthermore, as meanings enter new arena's they add something new and modify what was there all ready. The local set of meanings will never be the same again. This starts a process of coordination between relational spheres. They are not necessarily homogenized. "However, what was distant becomes intelligible- possibly real en possibly right." (p.26) * To engage in multi-vocal inquiry is to transform the relationship
among interlocutors.
2. Relational Responsibility in Practice (p.29) We now move to a more practical direction and ask the question: "Given these various lines of reasoning, how might a process of relational responsibility proceed?" We want to draw attention to a variety of practices that may variously be placed in the service of relational responsibility. For the sake of coherence, we will focus on practices congenial with our earlier emphases on internal others, conjoint relations, relations among groups and systemic process. a. Speaking the internal others
* Eric Berne's idea of the self as multiply populated
b. Crafting conjoint relations Some examples of practices, where the question of individual blame is layed aside and where attention is shifted to ways in which the reprehensible actions are accomplished in relationships: * The Milan Team's underscoring of the relational production of family
c. Invoking group realities Examples of practices in which relational responsibility is generated by expanding our scope of dialogue to relations among groups: * Traditional role playing practices enable people to appreciate the
d. Entering the systemic swim Practices where the ways are explored in which even the simples of actions is embedded within an infinitely expanded domain: * Murray Bowen who abandoned therapy devoted to individual problems,
To conclude, "we are de-emphasizing final products … in favor of continuous engagement in relational inquiry." (p.47) Furthermore, "we are placing a strong value on relational life itself, that is, a condition in which actions are coordinated with the vast surrounds from which they derive their identity." (p.47) 2. A Case in Point (p.49) 1 Relational responsibility holds substantial promise for the normal give and take of daily life. But what about those cases in which we not only wish to blame, but almost feel it as our moral duty to do so? Let's explore child sexual abuse. In child sexual abuse the impulse to blame and punish is intense. The perpetrator is evil, morally corrupt, degenerate, emotionally perverted or mentally ill. Long term incarceration and hospitalization are common solutions. First, remember that we don't want to throw the individualist tradition in the dustbin. We are want to promote a space of critical reflection, to ask about the limitations of this tradition and possible alternatives. We want to broaden and enrich the conversation and in that way also our options for action. Let's first look at the search for internal others. "There may be evil [in the perpetrator], but there is more. … The person [is] constituted by many voices, some dear and valuable." (p.51) Many perpetrators have been sexually abused themselves. "Their abuse, in effect, may speak the voice of their elders." If we listen to other voices within, we may hear the voice that wants to be a responsible parent instead of a hurting one. These inner voices have also value in therapy. For instances, by inquiring what the perpetrator believes the victim or his spouse would feel. It also functions as a preventative. "Through the voice of the media the realm of the erotic expands, and increasingly, child molesting becomes 'a choice', as opposed to an absurdity. Inquiries into the way such voices speak the perpetrators, opens new conversations about media responsibility." (p.51) Let us turn to conjoint relations. Here it is essential to recognize the constructed character of child abuse. We are dealing here with culturally constructed categories. "[T]o where and whom they apply and with what implications are matters of cultural and historical situation." (p.52) "The existence of child molesting requires conjoint relations. The actions in question may have meant one thing to the participants at the time and another thing as they later spoke about them. … In terms of relational responsibility, the point is not to locate the truth so much as to sustain enough ambiguity that the door to meaning making is never finally closed. … There is wisdom in exploring, with those involved, …the multiple meanings that may have been at play for them."(p.52) And what about the possibilities of invoking group realities? It is important to remain curious about the possibility that participants in child abuse act 'on behalf' of broader groups in society. "To what extent for example, is a male offender representing or acting on behalf of males more generally?" (P.52) What is the role of the mythology of male ownership of the family? and so on. Last, we must consider exploration of the systemic swim. "How can we broaden our understanding of contributing factors?" What about cultural condition? For example we can discus the role of the media and how they generate a context for child molesting. Concluding, "we want to reassert that our discussion of child
sexual abuse was not directed at providing solutions. Nor is it intended
to convey some masked approval for such activities. Our hope is to
expand our resources for action and thus for understanding." (p.53)
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